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Social Justice and the Charter: 
Comparison and Choice
MARGOT YOUNG *
At a time of radical inequality, the changes sought by social justice advocacy are urgently need-
ed. Yet repeatedly, courts fail to respond adequately to this challenge. A core issue plagues 
social justice jurisprudence under sections 7 and 15: the diffi culty inevitable in the contem-
plation and expression of the social and political forms in which oppression and social 
injustice occur. This problem manifests doctrinally in ways specifi c to the rights at issue. 
In section 15 cases, the casting of comparator groups has been deeply problematic, and in 
both section 15 and section 7 cases, the courts fail to deliver a nuanced understanding of 
how notions of choice ought (and ought not) to fi gure in the consideration of rights claims. 
Judgments map a complex reality in both powerful and necessarily incomplete ways. Judicial 
attentiveness to this fact will determine the role that the Charter does or does not play in the 
reach for social justice.
À une époque d’inégalité radicale, les changements que recherchent les défenseurs de la 
justice sociale s’avèrent nécessaires de toute urgence. Pourtant, les tribunaux évitent 
constamment de réagir à ce défi  de façon appropriée. Une question fondamentale entrave la 
jurisprudence de la justice sociale en vertu des articles 7 et 15, soit la diffi culté inéluctable 
de l’examen et de l’expression de la forme sociale et politique sous laquelle surviennent 
l’oppression et la justice sociale. Ce problème se manifeste au plan doctrinaire de manières 
particulières aux droits dont il est question. En fonction de l’article 15, le choix de groupes 
comparatifs s’est avéré considérablement problématique, et dans les causes relevant tant de 
l’article 15 que de l’article 7, les tribunaux n’offrent pas une compréhension nuancée de la 
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IT IS NOT THAT THE COURTS have not had the right case. Nor is it that smart 
doctrinal arguments have yet to be made. Yet, in thirty years of litigation under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 social justice victories are few and 
slim. Th is is not the future many social justice activists heralded in 1982.2 Why 
has Charter litigation proven such barren ground for social justice intervention?
Th e question is an important one. We face, in political theorist Nancy Fraser’s 
words, “a time when an aggressively expanding capitalism is radically exacerbat-
ing economic inequality.”3 Th e changes that social justice advocacy litigation 
seeks are urgently needed. In this context, judicial treatment of constitutions 
has at least two signifi cant implications for constitutional democracies such as 
Canada.4 First, judicial review is an important accountability measure. It provides 
some means for holding the exercise of power, at least by the state, to collectively 
generated norms, limits, and standards as signalled by a country’s constitution. 
Th us, judicial review under the Charter, at its best, serves as a cross-check on 
otherwise legally unassailable government action and funding decisions. Rights 
litigation in particular does this by providing a forum and metric for evaluation 
1. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 [Charter].
2. See Bruce Porter, “Twenty Years of Equality Rights: Reclaiming Expectations” (2005) 23:1 
Windsor YB Access Just 145 [Porter, “Reclaiming Expectations”].
3. “Rethinking Recognition” 3 New Left Review 107 at 108.
4. Enjoining the debate over judicial review is not my purpose here. For an interesting 
foray into that territory, see James B Kelly & Michael Murphy, “Confronting Judicial 
Supremacy: A Defence of Judicial Activism and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Legal Rights 
Jurisprudence” (2001) 16:1 CJLS 3.
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manière dont les notions de choix devraient ou non fi gurer lors de l’examen des réclamations 
ayant trait aux droits. Les jugements dépeignent une réalité complexe et forcément incomplète. 
L’attention judiciaire accordée à ce fait déterminera le rôle que la Charte jouera ou ne jouera 
pas dans la quête de la justice sociale.
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of state action in accordance with the protections set out in a bill of rights. Th is 
process provides a highly public site for the articulation of claims, often catalyzing a 
broader political and social appreciation of otherwise more subterranean issues of 
distribution, participation, and voice.5  As two legal academics scribe, “Th e benefi t 
of a Charter challenge is that it can serve both as a forum for the deliberation of 
resource allocation, and as a catalyst for wider public debate … .”6 In this sense, 
Charter litigation is used as potentially both “a tool and a terrain”7 for pushing 
social change.
Second, as the courts perform this task, the judiciary sends powerful and 
infl uential messages about the perpetuation and evolution of norms that are 
central and critical to our polity. Th ese messages shape how we understand our 
shared political community and key relationships between the state, society, and 
the individual.8 John Whyte writes that the introduction of a bill of rights into 
our Constitution9 ushered in a “new paradigm—a range of constitution-based 
controls of the relationship between state and citizen … shift[ing] a signifi cant 
class of personal interests from the domain of politics to that of law … .”10 
Whether such strong judicial infl uence and power is politically desirable or 
not, it is nonetheless the era that the Charter confi rms. Court pronouncements 
speak loudly, legitimating certain visions of society and de-legitimating others. 
What those messages are matters. We may decry the infl uence given to courts, 
but we cannot deny that in the current mock-up it is no small concern what 
they pronounce.11 
5. Bruce Porter, “Claiming Adjudicative Space: Social Rights, Equality, and Citizenship” in 
Margot Young et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2007) 77.
6. Colleen M Flood & Michelle Zimmerman, “Judicious Choices: Health Care Resource 
Decisions and the Supreme Court” in Jocelyn Downie & Elaine Gibson, eds, Health Law at 
the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) 25 at 54.
7. Th e linkage of these two notions is Martha Jackman’s. See Martha Jackman, “Constitutional 
Castaways: Poverty and the McLachlin Court” [Jackman, “Castaways”] in Sanda Rodgers 
& Sheila McIntyre, eds, Th e Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, 
Retrenchment or Retreat (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2010) 297 at 299 [Rodgers & 
McIntyre, Social Justice]. Th e phrase captures strategic use of the Charter as both a method of 
and a platform for advocacy.
8. See generally Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman & David Taras, Th e Last Word: Media 
Coverage of the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006).
9. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
10. “Th e Charter at 30: A Refl ection” (2012) 17:1 Rev Const Stud 1 at 1.
11. In this statement, I demonstrate a key inclination of what Gavin Anderson describes as the 
third phase of Canadian constitutional criticism. Anderson argues that in such criticism, “the 
key consideration is pragmatic: Even if far from ideal, rights constitutionalism cannot simply 
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Th is article takes up the question of the scarcity and paucity of successful social 
justice rights challenges by looking at jurisprudence under sections 7 and 15 of 
the Charter—the sections that provide protection for life, liberty, and security of 
person, and that guarantee equality respectively. Notably, the text of the Charter 
provides no explicit guarantees of social and economic rights.12 Consequently, 
legal activism has focused on one or the other of these two sections as an 
expandable base for textual interpretation that would allow for some specifi c 
social and economic protection. Social justice claims have thus cycled between 
these two Charter provisions as ciphers for rendering the Charter more responsive 
to the injustices of twenty-fi rst century Canadian society. 
Th e term “social justice” is used in this article in a loose and embracive 
manner (also, perhaps, in an abrasive manner, as I wish it to have some “scouring” 
force). Th e Supreme Court of Canada itself has used the phrase “social justice,” 
although, as Heather McLeod-Kilmurray notes, clear elaboration by the Court 
of what the notion signals—either in general or in the specifi c context of the case 
at play—is lacking.13 For the purposes of this article, “social justice” signifi es 
claims for more just distribution, recognition, and empowerment.14 At study is 
litigation that has, as its goal, redistribution of privilege and disadvantage in a 
more politically justifi able manner. In particular, I reference Janine Brodie’s 
formulation that accounts for the signifi cance of attaching the term “social” to 
the idea of “justice.”15 Brodie argues that the conjoining of the terms “social” and 
“justice” allows recognition of the key political goal of fi xing the “inherent gap 
between liberalism’s promise of citizen equality and the structural inequalities of 
capitalism.”16 In the constitutional legal context, it is about affi  rming and asserting 
be wished away, and it remains a key site of democratic struggle.” Gavin W Anderson, “Th e 
New Borders of the Constitutional” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 737 at 745-46.
12. In this sense, our Charter is an older generation of a bill of rights, one that omits explicit 
protection of at least some social and economic rights.
13. “Does Preserving the Environment Advance or Confl ict with Social Justice and Human 
Rights?” in Rodgers & McIntyre, Social Justice, supra note 7 at 465. McLeod-Kilmurray goes 
on to spell out the connection between social justice and environmental protection, noting 
that the two have complex involvements. Th is is, of course, beyond the scope of this article, 
but indicates how rich and complex the political deployment and projection of social justice 
necessarily is (ibid at 466-70).
14. See the discussion in Nancy Fraser, “Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-
Dimensional Approach to Gender Justice” (2007) 1:1 Stud in Soc Just 23 at 24.
15. “Reforming Social Justice in Neoliberal Times” (2007) 1:2 Stud in Soc Just 93 at 93-95.
16. Ibid at 98. For a longer discussion of this, see Margot Young, “Unequal to the Task: 
‘Kapp’ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15” [Young, “Unequal”] in Rodgers & 
McIntyre, Social Justice, supra note 7.
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the “responsibilities on government to identify and proactively address issues of 
socio-economic disadvantage and systemic discrimination … .”17 
Social justice challenges across sections 7 and 15 have had mixed success. 
Generally, the courts have not been receptive to cases that plead the causes of 
the most economically marginalized and disadvantaged in our society. Cases that 
have recently been successful have often looked to section 7 rights as an anchor 
for specifi c and narrow justice claims of marginalized groups.18 Section 15 claims 
raising similar social justice aspirations have tended to meet with failure. Indeed, 
one might argue that section 15 doctrine is stalled—the Court is apparently stymied 
as to how to elaborate a functional and substantive approach to equality claims. 
Section 7 doctrine, in contrast, has proven quite amenable to a more contextual 
and nuanced appraisal in at least a few cases, although important qualifi cations 
pertain here.
Th is article does not attempt to decide which of the two sections is the best 
bet for future social justice challenges. Instead, the article’s purpose is to identify 
a central tension apparent in articulations of social justice claims that fi gures 
signifi cantly in the jurisprudence of both sets of rights. Th is article argues that a 
core concern plagues social justice Charter litigation per se. Th is issue manifests 
itself slightly diff erently in section 15 and section 7 cases given the doctrinal 
variations of the two sections. But it is this article’s argument that an issue is 
common across all social justice litigation. Quickly spun, the challenge is that 
courts have failed to contemplate adequately the social and political form in 
which oppression and social injustice occur.19 Central to this is a failure to theorize 
and to address fully the manner in which individual harm and systemic fi elds of 
social power hierarchies co-occur. Th is confounding of individual and systemic 
features of oppression condemns courts to overly simplistic, thin, and ultimately 
unsatisfactory contemplation of the social injustices these cases foreground. 
Th e tasks, then, that this paper takes up are to chronicle social justice cases 
across both sections 7 and 15, to assess some of the case law these decisions have 
generated, and to analyze where and how opportunities best lie for social justice 
Charter rights litigation. A variety of critical perspectives on Charter litigation 
generally as well as issues specifi c to each of these rights sections will inform the 
17. Porter, “Reclaiming Expectations,” supra note 2 at 172.
18. See e.g. Attorney General of Canada et al v Bedford et al, 2012 ONCA 186, 109 OR (3d) 1; 
Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, 3 SCR 134 
[Insite (SCC)].
19. I am not making any claims in this article about the specifi c forms of harm that oppression 
takes. For this question, see Iris Marion Young, “Five Faces of Oppression” in Justice and the 
Politics of Diff erence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) ch 2.
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analysis. Part I of the article is an elaboration of the conceptual challenge that op-
pression, and its social justice responses, present to Charter rights litigation. Th is 
Part invokes more theoretical treatment of social injustice, and of the harms that one 
would wish sections 15 and 7 to recognize, by looking at social theorists’ treatment of 
oppression and power. Part II introduces the specifi c doctrinal challenges of both 
sections 7 and 15 triggered by the courts’ failures to comprehend successfully 
the interconnection and layering of oppression. Th is failure has some section-
specifi c implications: In section 15 it has rendered the casting of comparator 
groups deeply problematic, and in both section 7 and section 15 it has allowed 
the courts to engage problematic notions of choice as spoilers of rights claims. 
Th e fi nal Part concludes with the recognition that adequate consideration of the 
relationship between individual harm and systemic hierarchies is diffi  cult, but it 
is a challenge importantly engaged.
I. THE CHALLENGE: INDIVIDUALS IN CONTEXT
Nuanced and eff ective treatment of the relationship between individual harm and 
systemic fi elds of social power is key to any social justice claim. As Sherene Razack 
notes, “responses to subordinate groups are socially organized to sustain existing 
power arrangements … .”20 Equality theorists—particularly those schooled in 
law—have been articulate in theorizing the complex placement of persons and 
groups in broader patterns of hierarchy and oppression informed by a range of 
social divisions. Debate continues about how to interpret the relationship 
between social divisions and how to conceptualize the diff erent analytic levels 
at which to understand such relationships.21 Nira Yuval-Davis argues that social 
divisions operate at a number of levels: Social divisions have “organizational, 
intersubjective, experiential and representational forms … .”22 Th ese divisions “are 
expressed in specifi c institutions and organizations …” and “involve specifi c power 
and aff ective relationships between actual people” that aff ect how individuals 
experience their daily lives.23 Th ey also adhere at the level of representation; that 
20. Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race, and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 8.
21. Nira Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics” (2006) 13:3 Eur J Wom Stud at 
195 [Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality”].
22. Ibid at 198. Other theorists articulate other diff erences across analyses. See e.g. Ina Kerner, 
“Feminist Th eory and the Representation of Diversity” (Paper delivered at the American 
Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 2012), online: <http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2104789>.
23. Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 198.
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is, they are expressed in symbols, texts, and ideologies.24 Simply put, group 
experiences—as shapers of individual circumstances—are relevant, and the right 
to equality is about both groups and individuals as members of the oppressed or 
marginalized. Th ere is no “ground zero”25 at which historical and social context 
and group membership are irrelevant.26 Social divisions structure and form the 
axes of social power, and actual, concrete people are caught up along these axes.27 
Th e resulting hierarchies of diff erential access to a range of resources28 constitute 
the stuff  of equality analyses.
Th ree important observations have emerged from this literature. First, individual 
identity is multiple, fractured, and infi nite.29 Th is means not simply that the world 
is diverse (which, of course, it is marvellously), but also that individuals map onto 
this diversity in varied, shifting, and numerous ways. As Darren Lenard Hutchinson 
writes, “oppression is fl uid and contextual and … operates on many diff erent axes.”30 
No one vector of identity captures any one individual experience, and we are all 
marked—although often do not acknowledge ourselves as such—by every identity 
variable at play.31 No person is “left untouched,”32 and no single category can 
capture the “wide range of diff erent experiences, identities, and social locations” 
in the world.33 Social divisions “are not reducible to each other.”34 Th e insistence 
on pigeonholing comparison “falsely homogenize[s] the experiences of diff erent 
group members.”35 Th us, the “pixilation of human experience”36 done by the 
24. Ibid.
25. Razack, supra note 20 at 8.
26. Young, “Unequal,” supra note 16.
27. Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 198.
28. Ibid.
29. See Rita Kaur Dhamoon, “Considerations on Mainstreaming Intersectionality” (2011) 64:1 
Pol Res Q 230 at 231.
30. “New Complexity Th eories: From Th eoretical Innovation to Doctrinal Reform” (2002) 71 
UMKC L Rev 431 at 442.
31. Nancy Ehrenreich’s discussion of “hybrid intersectionality” off ers a compelling account of 
how the particular mixes of privilege and oppression many experience co-shape individual 
perspectives and circumstances. See Nancy Ehrenreich, “Subordination and Symbiosis: 
Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems” (2002) 71:2 UMKC L Rev 
251 at 266 [Ehrenreich, “Subordination and Symbiosis”].
32. Kerri A Froc, “Multidimensionality and the Matrix: Identifying Charter Violations in Cases 
of Complex Subordination” (2010) 25:1 CJLS 21 at 23.
33. Leslie McCall, “Th e Complexity of Intersectionality” (2005) 30:3 Signs: J of Women in 
Culture and Soc’y 1771 at 1777.
34. Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 200.
35. Nancy Levit, “Introduction: Th eorizing the Connections Among Systems of Subordination” 
(2002-2003) 71:1 UMKC L Rev 227.
36. Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” (2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 
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categorization of constitutional law has been criticized. Social divisions, while 
ontologically distinct from one another, are “always constructed and intermeshed 
in other social divisions,”37 are contested, and evolve in context. Th ese social 
categories are interactive; they reinforce, challenge, and shape each other, rather 
than simply intercross.38 In any analysis of oppression, one must be alert to the 
“homogenizing and simplifying dangers of category-based research.”39 Th e dan-
gers of narratives that ignore such a warning include rendering invisible the most 
marginal in any specifi c social category.40  
Second, such identity features are patterned. Power and privilege (and 
discrimination and disadvantage) are distributed repetitively—and predictably—
along sets of lines of identity. Yuval-Davis makes the argument that analyses must 
retain the multiplexity and multidimensionality of identities within contemporary 
society, but without losing sight of the diff erential power dimension of diff erent 
collectivities and groupings within the society and the variety of relationships of 
domination/subordination between them.41  
Certain identity features are coded as desirable and admirable, others as not so 
positive. Discrimination is not randomly distributed, skipping haphazardly from 
one trait to another, but piles up in the same channels. 
Th ird, the structures of power set up by such discrimination are mutually 
reinforcing; they tend to concentrate and compound.42 Th e most disadvantaged 
individuals and groups will typically experience stigmatization and discrimination 
along several identity vectors. Oppressions are interlocking and stack one upon the 
other. While the particular patterning may be historically and culturally specifi c and 
“under continuous processes of contestation and change,”43 systems of oppression 
reinforce each other. Th ey are “interrelated rather than confl icting phenomena.”44  
Th ese three observations feature, in one form or another, in an extensive 
literature on the intersectionality of oppressions and on identity constitution,45 
277 at 284.
37. Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 195.
38. See Froc, supra note 32 at 23.
39. McCall, supra note 33 at 1786.
40. Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 195.
41. Nira Yuval-Davis, “Th e Citizenship Debate: Women, Ethnic Processes and the State” (1991) 
39 Fem Rev 58 at 67.
42. See Levit, supra note 35 at 233, citing Nancy S Ehrenreich, “O.J. Simpson & the Myth of 
Gender/Race Confl ict” (1996) 67:4 U Colo L Rev 931 at 945-46.
43. Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality,” supra note 21 at 200.
44. Levit, supra note 35 at 231.
45. McCall, a sociologist, defi nes intersectionality as “the most important theoretical 
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where it is recognized that destabilization of the categories of identity is often 
critical to positive social change.46 Yet, to summarize, the oppression that the 
most marginalized in society experience is a tangle. To pull on one string, to focus 
on only one aspect of the disempowerment, is impossible. Diff erent features of 
the overall experience are knotted together and the jumble is uniquely and singularly 
created by those mutually entwined knots, twists, and threadings.  
I am not alone in turning to metaphor to capture the social confi guration 
of oppression.47 Metaphors abound in academics’ attempts to portray this complex 
web of identities in which individuals are sited. Nancy Ehrenreich uses the idea 
of symbiosis, the kind of relationship that exists between mycorrhizae fungi 
and plants.48 Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis proff er the idea of the 
KOOSHTM ball (a child’s toy made up of hundreds of multicoloured rubber 
bands tied together at the centre of each) to convey postmodern understand-
ings of the mobile matrix of categories that constitute a nonetheless graspable 
individual reality.49 Kimberle Crenshaw originated the image of “intersec-
tionality” to capture issues of African American women’s employment.50 
Hester Lessard uses the children’s game of freeing a trapped ice cream truck to 
convey ideas about the gridlock created by Charter argument.51 Th ere are many 
more examples. Th e area is rich with turns to creative and engaging depictions of 
complex conceptualization.
Th is use of metaphor by equality theorists is enticing. Th e proff ering of a 
clever novel visualization or the contrasting of a new image to more received 
conceptualization can “unstick” thinking.52 Th e eff ect is a creative and elegant 
contribution” of women’s studies, understanding it as “the relationships among multiple 
dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations.” Supra note 33 at 1771.
46. Ibid at 1777.
47. Jennifer Nedelsky notes, more generally, that “[l]aw, like all conceptual systems, relies on 
metaphor.” See Law’s Relations: A Relational Th eory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) at 91 [footnotes omitted]. 
48. “Subordination and Symbiosis,” supra note 31 at 277.
49. “Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible” (1995) 35 Santa Clara L Rev 
881 at 899-900.
50.  “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Th eory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) U Chicago 
Legal F 139.
51. “Charter Gridlock: Equality Formalism and Marriage Fundamentalism” in Sheila McIntyre 
& Sanda Rodgers, eds, Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006) 291 at 292 [McIntyre & Rodgers, 
Diminishing Returns].
52. It is diffi  cult to talk about the use of metaphor without resorting to metaphor.
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literature on this topic. But some critical pause is necessary. Peter Kwan has 
written about the use of metaphor, arguing that while metaphors are extremely 
helpful in conversations employing high levels of abstraction, it is important that 
the metaphor not replace the concept.53 His caution is twofold. First, we must 
be careful not to bestow “ontological status to that which properly belongs to 
systems of thought.”54 Th at is, we must not confuse real objects with concepts 
that belong simply to systems of thought: “Race, gender, and sexual orientation 
are not things like plants and fungi with separate and independent existences. 
Th ey are concepts, used within systems of language and culture, to apportion and 
police regimes of power.”55 Second, the chosen metaphor must not function to 
limit or weaken the conceptual claim that one wishes to make.56 Metaphors risk 
in their literalness—which, incidentally, is also part of their value—too rigidly or 
narrowly constricting the desired conceptual point. Indeed, “metaphors inevitably 
distort or shape our perceptions in the sense that they hide some dimensions 
of the phenomenon they refer to and highlight others.”57 Th e challenge is to 
craft the right metaphor for the moment, one that conveys most evocatively the 
under-expressed or complex conceptual point one wishes to communicate.
In any case, and independent of the creative imagery employed to convey 
these three theoretical points about oppression and identity, the conversation 
about interconnected and multiple identity features is an important discussion 
to have in the context of social justice aspirations. True, these theoretical 
observations are no longer novel or startling.58 But they are nonetheless basic, 
unavoidable, and important. Th ese observations therefore bear repeating and 
summarizing—they elaborate the tricky background against which social justice 
claims and litigation take shape. And, it is my argument that this complexity is 
often what the courts fail to contemplate adequately, with clear, persistent, and 
troubling doctrinal implications.
53. “Th e Metaphysics of Metaphors: Symbiosis and the Quest for Meaning” (2002) 71:2 UMKC 
L Rev 325 at 327.
54. Ibid at 328.
55. Ibid at 328-29 [footnotes omitted; emphasis in original].
56. Ibid at 329.
57. Nedelsky, supra note 47 at 98.
58. Ange-Marie Hancock notes that “the idea of analyzing race, gender and class identities 
together has existed for over a century.” See Ange-Marie Hancock, “When Multiplication 
Doesn’t Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm” (2007) 
5:1 Perspectives on Politics 63 at 63.
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II. THE CASES AND THE CHARTER: COMPARISON AND 
CHOICE
On occasion, individual Supreme Court justices have come close to recognizing 
the complexity of individual identity, at least in principle. For example, Justice 
Wilson in the Morgentaler case noted that:
An individual is not a totally independent entity disconnected from the society in 
which he or she lives. Neither, however, is the individual a mere cog in an impersonal 
machine in which his or her values, goals and aspirations are subordinated to those 
of the collectivity. Th e individual is a bit of both.59 
Of course, this is not a remarkable observation. It simply contemplates the 
metaphor of separateness and independence as ill-fi tting for the full experience of 
the individual in community and notes a tension in the distinction between the 
individual and the collective. But, as such, it is certainly the starting place for the 
necessarily more layered and nuanced consideration of oppression that social justice 
necessitates. Yet the fuller reach of recognition of complex identity is lacking.
In this Part, the analysis turns to many of the cases in which litigants from 
across Canada have tried to leverage Charter rights into successful claims for 
a more just distribution of resources. As already mentioned, the discussion is 
limited to cases involving one or both of sections 7 and 15. Th e review is not a 
complete cataloguing, nor is it more than merely illustrative. Instead, the hope 
is, through recollection of some tough cases, to adumbrate the major snares in 
which social justice litigation under these two sections is likely to get caught. 
More directly, this Part identifi es two doctrinal challenges or impasses that have 
resulted from inadequate judicial acknowledgment of the theoretical lesson 
proff ered by feminist identity theorists. First, social justice litigation demands a 
subtle and layered unpacking of individual features at play in any claim of harm 
made by a claimant. Th is sets up a problem for the inevitable comparison that 
section 15 entails and the often unacknowledged harm defi nition central to a 
section 7 analysis. I consider this problem fi rst. Th e article then turns to the second 
problem: social justice claims are often defeated by the ascription of agency or 
choice to the claimant as the cause of the harm at root in the claim. Once 
ascribed, choice functions to defeat the claimant’s request for state action of any 
sort in relation to such harm. I argue that this assignment of choice, and the fact 
that such choice matters, rest on faulty conceptualization of the individual in 
the context of systemic structures of oppression.
59. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 at 164, 63 OR (2d) 281.
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A. COMPARISON: GROUP CONSTITUTION AND CAPTURING HARM
Both section 7 and section 15 analyses demonstrate inadequate attention to the 
complex of social divisions in which individuals are interlarded, particularly in refer-
ence to how courts understand the use of comparator analysis in section 15 cases and 
the crystallization of the harm complained of in section 7 cases. Admittedly, pinning 
down group identity is tough—maybe even impossible to do fully in any specifi c 
circumstance—and is certainly politically fraught. As noted, even describing 
group identity on a conceptual or theoretical level sends academics off  on glori-
ous rounds of metaphor creation. But grasping this complexity is a critical part of 
analyses under these sections and is probably unavoidable in social justice claims. 
Account must be taken of a “multiplicity of social logics” and attentiveness given to 
how diff erence must be recognized, shared, and ultimately valued.60  
1. SECTION 15
Th e Supreme Court of Canada has been unwaveringly clear that the equality 
protected under section 15 is a comparative concept.61 Th is means that the Court 
will have to select from the infi nite variety of individual features that any 
claimant possesses those that are the most pertinent, or relevant even, to the 
claim, such that an eff ective, framed, and appropriately narrowed comparison 
can take place. But such a tactic is hazardous. It involves judicial judgment as to 
what aspects of the claimant are relevant to the claim as the analysis is forced to 
select from a complex that is more than simply additive. Th is risks that courts 
will proceed as if only a few of the relevant features or social divisions that make 
sense of the individual experiences are involved. Th e parsing of identity to key 
features raises well-discussed problems. It risks blindness to diff erences within 
identity categories, enhancing marginalization of subgroups.62 It also makes 
diffi  cult the recognition of the socially constructed nature of identity; justifi cation 
of identity framing will often emphasize ideas of natural or innate qualities.63 
Diminished is appreciation for the constructed, multiple, and elastic character 
60. Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouff e, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, 2d ed (London, UK: Verso, 2001) at 188.
61. In the Court’s fi rst s 15 case, McIntyre J stated that equality as a comparative concept 
may “only be attained or discerned by comparison with the condition of others in the 
social and political setting in which the question arises.” Law Society of British Columbia v 
Andrews, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at para 26, 56 DLR (4th) 1. See also Law v Canada (Minister of 
Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 24, 170 DLR (4th) 1 [Law].
62. Levit, supra note 35 at 227.
63. Ibid at 227-28.
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of individual placement along lines of social divisions. Th us, Patricia Williams 
writes that equality analyses risk recasting “the general group experience [of the 
marginal] as a fragmented series of specifi c, isolated events rather than a pervasive 
social phenomenon … .”64 Foregrounding too thin or too simple a set of 
individual characteristics ignores how oppression redoubles and connects. Th ere 
are “political and social consequences of the failure to attend to the many mutual 
relationships between identity categories.”65 Yet, equally, having too many features 
under consideration threatens the possibility of eff ective analysis.
Th e response at both the theoretical and doctrinal levels has been to talk 
of intersectionality—a term, as I have already mentioned, coined by Kimberle 
Crenshaw and now part of a common equality law lexicon.66 Th e image of 
intersectionality captures the recognition of the cross-weaving character of 
identity and anchors anti-essentialist theorizing about the social dynamics of 
inequality.67 In an infl uential article, Leslie McCall has described intersectionality 
as referring to “the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of 
social relations and subject formations” in order to overcome “the limitations of 
gender [for example] as a single analytical category.”68  
Th e idea of intersectionality has come in for critique. Like any metaphor, it is 
partial only.69 But it is an image with which Canadian courts are taken. Its acceptance 
in the Court’s decision in Law v Canada echoes across other section 15 equality 
cases: “Th ere is no reason in principle, therefore, why a discrimination claim 
positing an intersection of grounds cannot be understood as analogous to, or 
as a synthesis of, the grounds listed in s. 15(1).”70 In an earlier example, Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, for the minority in Canada (Attorney General) v Mossop, notes:
64. Th e Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
1991) at 13.
65. Kwan, supra note 53 at 329, citing Ehrenreich, “Subordination and Symbiosis,” supra note 
31 at 266, 281-83.
66. See e.g. Mary Eaton, “Patently Confused: Complex Inequality and Canada v. Mossop” (1994) 
1:2 Rev Cons Stud 203 at 229; Kerner, supra note 21 at 2.
67. See Emily Grabham et al, “Introduction” in Emily Grabham et al, eds, Intersectionality and 
Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location (Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 1 at 
2.
68. McCall, supra note 33 at 1771.
69. Th eorists note that the metaphor ignores “areas of the social that exist apart from the meeting 
point, or overlap, that intersectionality describes.” See Emily Grabham et al, supra note 67 
at 2. For a discussion of both the usefulness and weaknesses of the metaphor, see generally 
Dhamoon, supra note 29; Froc, supra note 32; Grabham et al, supra note 67. Even Crenshaw 
herself has noted that the metaphor has been employed in a less than useful manner. See 
Dhamoon, supra note 29 at 232.
70. Law, supra note 61 at para 94.
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[C]ategories of discrimination may overlap, and ... individuals may suff er historical 
ex-clusion on the basis of both race and gender, age and physical handicap, or some 
other combination. Th e situation of individuals who confront multiple grounds of 
disadvantage is particularly complex. Categorizing such discrimination as primarily 
racially oriented, or primarily gender-oriented, misconceives the reality of discrimination 
as it is experienced by individuals.71
Generally, judges treat the idea, at least, of intersectionality as unremarkable. 
Using the metaphor, however, is not the same as successfully deploying its 
message. Th ere are problems with this judicial turn. Canadian courts have not 
translated the theoretical recognition into practical and politically acute argument. 
Intersectionality tends to be treated by courts as simply a statement of “a 
combination of grounds.”72 Th e Court has yet to recognize, in theory or doctrine, 
that group characterization cannot merely be an additive process. For example, it 
is not that discrimination need only be shown on one or the other or several of a 
variety of grounds.73 Discrimination is not properly characterized as simply a list 
of some number of grounds along which disadvantage occurs.
Certainly, the Court has demonstrated some limited but key aspects of an 
eff ective appreciation of intersectionality’s lessons, albeit formulated diff erently 
than in the language of intersectionality. Th ese are those doctrinal advances in 
equality law that prevent overly simplistic and non-fragmented conceptualization 
of individual categories such as gender. Th us, the Court has allowed that group 
identity can be both over- and under-inclusive. Th is means that claims of dis-
crimination on the basis of, say, gender cannot be defeated by showing that not 
all women receive the discriminatory treatment,74 or that some men also receive 
the discriminatory treatment. Th is doctrinal wisdom prevents the silly conclusions 
71. [1993] 1 SCR 554 at 645-46 [citations omitted], 100 DLR (4th) 658.
72. Law, supra note 61 at para 94.  
73. One of the few equality cases to attempt, as opposed to merely acknowledge the possibility 
of, an intersectional analysis is the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Falkiner v Ontario 
(Ministry of Community and Social Services, Income Maintenance Branch). In this case, Laskin 
JA argued that: “Multiple comparator groups are needed to bring into focus the multiple 
forms of diff erential treatment alleged.” (2002), 59 OR (3d) 481 at para 72, 212 DLR (4th) 
633. Laskin JA then proceeded to look at each ground in turn, as if characterization of the 
claimants was additive rather than interactive. His conclusion was that
undertaking diff erent comparisons to assess diff erent forms of diff erential treatment is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s directive to apply the Law analysis fl exibly. Th is fl exible 
comparative approach refl ects the complexity and context of the respondents’ claim and captures 
the aff ront to their dignity, which lies at the heart of a s. 15 challenge. I have concluded that the 
respondents have received diff erential treatment on the basis of sex, marital status and receipt 
of social assistance (ibid at para 81). 
74. See Brooks v Canada Safeway Ltd, [1989] 1 SCR 1219, 59 DLR (4th) 321.
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of earlier cases that treatment of only some women cannot be based on gender or 
that treatment that aff ects many women but also a few men is thereby not gender-
based.75 Th ese recognitions encode, without explicit articulation as such, the lesson 
that social divisions cross-cut each other. Canadian courts do better on this count 
than American courts.76  
Th e Court’s decision in Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General)77 illustrates 
a judicial failure to take into account fuller lessons of the theory that spawned 
the metaphor of intersectionality. Th e case involved a challenge, on a number of 
constitutional and legislative grounds, to the base amount of welfare benefi ts 
provided for adults under thirty years of age by Quebec law.78 Th is base rate was 
set at approximately one-third the rate of benefi ts available to older welfare recipients. 
Much has already been written about the failure of the Court in Gosselin to aff ord 
the claimant, Louise Gosselin, substantive equality rights.79 I mention the case here 
simply to note that the majority’s framing of the claimant group misses key 
social divisions shaping claimant experience under the impugned legislation. 
Evidence before the Court included extensive testimony from Louise Gosselin 
herself about her attempts to subsist on the under-thirty benefi t level and her 
eff orts to participate in the workfare and other government programmes formally 
off ered to enhance that benefi t level. Th is evidence demonstrated the relevance 
of Gosselin’s gender, disability, and economic status to the “acute material and 
psychological insecurity, deprivation and indignity” she suff ered.80 Th e Court 
rejected the suffi  ciency of this evidence and considered discrimination only in 
terms of the ground of “age.”81 As a result, the harms of which Gosselin com-
plained appear in attenuated form. Failure to capture fully the complexity of the 
oppression at issue risks rendering that oppression invisible. Th e discrimination 
becomes “hidden in plain sight.”82 It is like those images, seemingly composed of 
75. For an obvious example of such judicial absurdity, see Bliss v Canada (Attorney General), 
[1979] 1 SCR 183, 1978 CanLII 25.
76. See Bradley Allan Areheart, “Intersectionality and Identity: Revisiting a Wrinkle in Title VII” 
(2006) 17:1 Geo Mason U Civ Rts LJ 199.
77. 2002 SCC 84, 4 SCR 429 [Gosselin].
78. Regulation Respecting Social Aid, RRQ 1981, c A-16, r 1, s 29(a).
79. See Young et al, supra note 6
80. Jackman, “Castaways,” supra note 8, at 313.
81. Ibid at 314.
82. Areheart, supra note 76 at 229. For a compatible argument in relation to Native Women’s Assn 
of Canada v Canada, [1994] 3 SCR 627, 119 DLR (4th) 224, see Froc, supra note 32 at 42. 
Froc contends that the Court ignores the synergy between patriarchy and colonization with 
the result that the discriminatory harms the Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC) 
faces remain unacknowledged. Th e irony here, to which Froc points, is that NWAC becomes 
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many randomly, diff erently coloured and placed dots that, when viewed through 
glasses with red lenses, reveal one shape and when viewed through glasses with 
blue lenses, show some other image. Viewed without shaded lenses, the picture 
is simply a mess of incoherent coloured dots—there is no pattern, no coherent 
image. In the same manner, the ground of discrimination accepted as the lens 
for viewing the discrimination claim renders any given harm visible or invisible.
Th e recent section 15 case of Withler v Canada (Attorney General)83 takes 
up this sort of criticism of the Court’s formulation of comparator groups. Spe-
cifi cally, the judgment in this case calls for an approach that takes account of 
“the full context”84 of both the claimant circumstances and the eff ect of the 
challenged law on the claimant. Th e Court recognizes that the casting of 
comparator and claimant groups can dull the Court’s appreciation of the harm 
at issue.85 It is necessary, the Court states, to look to “a confl ux of factors.”86 Th e 
result of this series of acknowledgements is a judicial restatement of the use of 
comparator groups in equality analysis: Th e fi rst step of establishing diff erent 
treatment requires only that the claimant establish a distinction based on one or 
more enumerated or analogous grounds. It is unnecessary to pinpoint a particular 
group that precisely corresponds to the claimant group except for the personal 
characteristic or characteristics alleged to ground the discrimination. Th e claim 
should, then, proceed to the second step of the analysis, employing if necessary 
a wider variety of contextual understandings of claimant circumstances.87 Th is 
recognition of the importance of judicial framing of claimant circumstances and 
the oppression at issue is valuable, but judicial analyses remain vulnerable to 
inadequate acknowledgement of complexity and unacknowledged discretion in 
narrowing complexity. Th e Withler decision is itself, in its application of equality 
analysis to the facts, vulnerable to this criticism.
Adequate treatment of diff erence is, without doubt, a doctrinal uphill 
struggle. Th is is an area in which theorists themselves have diffi  culty conveying and 
the problem rather than selective and discriminatory government funding.
83. 2011 SCC 12, 1 SCR 396 [Withler].
84. Ibid at para 40.
85. In support of this contention, the Court cites a number of academic commentaries. See 
Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48 
McGill LJ 627; Nitya Iyer, “Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of 
Social Identity” (1993) 19 Queen’s LJ 179; Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of 
Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 CJWL 37. See also Dianne 
Pothier, “Equality as a Comparative Concept: Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, What’s the Fairest 
of Th em All?” in McIntyre & Rodgers, Diminishing Returns, supra note 51 at 135.
86. Withler, supra note 83 at para 58.
87. Ibid at para 65.
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translating their observations into pragmatic argument. Th e complex nature 
of oppression and its relationship to identity make comparative analysis tricky. 
Possibly, the task required is inevitably done badly; but acknowledgement of 
complexity is important. Failure to do so predisposes judicial handling of social 
justice claims to inadequacy. Such failure can buttress the very hierarchical relations 
at the root of social justice challenges.88
2. SECTION 7
Th e complex and prismatic nature of individual identity is also importantly, but 
alas equally inadequately, recognized under a section 7 analysis. True, the rights 
under section 7 are not comparatively granted, so no comparator group analysis 
is required. Th us, capturing the parameters of the comparator group and its contrasts 
with other groups is not a formally articulated step of the doctrinal analysis. But 
the casting of the claimant and her or his group identity is critical to identifi cation of 
the harms appraised under section 7. In this regard, the courts’ analysis in section 
7 cases can be as overly simplistic as in section 15 challenges. Failure to articulate 
a nuanced shaping of the claimant group under section 7 will limit understanding 
of the extent of rights infringement and of its consequent harms. Again, claimant 
characteristics as recognized by the courts fi lter what is perceived to be at issue. 
Identity grounds the claims advanced.
A recent British Columbia case, Victoria (City) v Adams89 demonstrates this 
clearly. Th is 2009 case dealt with a challenge to a Victoria municipal by-law by 
a number of homeless individuals. Th e British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld, 
albeit on slightly narrower grounds, the British Columbia Supreme Court’s 
decision declaring unconstitutional those portions of the by-law that prohibited 
shelterless people sleeping in parks from erecting temporary overhead shelter, 
such as tents, tarps attached to trees, or cardboard boxes.90 Th e case reads most 
straightforwardly as a victory for the rights claimants; in the absence of adequate 
public shelter beds, the homeless in Victoria may now sleep outside in public 
parks under whatever forms of temporary cover they can muster.91 Literally cold 
88. See Grabham et al, supra note 67 at 2.
89. 2008 BCSC 1363, 299 DLR (4th) 193 [Adams (BCSC)]. See also Victoria (City) v Adams, 
2009 BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29 [Adams (BCCA)].
90. See Adams (BCCA), ibid at para 166. Th e British Columbia Court of Appeal modifi ed 
the trial judge’s decision that held the by-law to be unconstitutional because there was an 
inadequate number of shelter beds available relative to the number of homeless people.
91. For critical analyses of this case, see e.g. Margot Young, “Rights, the Homeless, and Social 
Change: Refl ections on Victoria (City) v. Adams (BCSC),” Case Comment (2009) 164 BC 
Stud 103; Martha Jackman, “Charter Remedies for Socio-economic Rights Violations: 
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comfort perhaps, but a successful section 7 claim nonetheless.92  
Pointed comments about the scope of this case aside, a signifi cant feature 
of homelessness and shelter availability was left unacknowledged by the courts.93 
Shelter availability and suitability specifi cally, and conditions of homelessness 
more generally, are confi gured by the gender of the homeless population involved. 
Women encounter and respond to issues of housing insecurity in ways that are 
deeply marked by their gender.94 Traditional shelters are considerably less safe for 
women than men.95 Th ese shelters are thus a less accessible and practical form 
of temporary shelter for women than for men.96 Judicial assessment of shelter 
Sleeping Under a Box?” (Paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Institute 
for the Administration of Justice, Ottawa, 2 October 2009).
92. Of course these citizens have no access to private property of their own—they need public 
property on a permanent, not merely temporary, basis. Presumably, they need more than 
merely temporary overhead, overnight shelter as part of this. It does, after all, quite often 
rain or snow during the daytime in Victoria. For further analysis of this aspect of this and 
other cases, see Margot Young, “Sleeping Rough and Shooting Up: Taking British Columbia’s 
Social Justice Issues to Court,” forthcoming in Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, eds, 
Realizing Social Rights (Toronto: Irwin, 2013). See also Sarah E Hamill, “Private Property 
Rights and Public Responsibility: Leaving Room For Th e Homeless” (2011) 30:1 Windsor 
Rev Legal Soc Issues 91.
93. Arguably, the trial judge in Adams (BCSC) might have had some sense of this, stating in her 
judgment that had there been enough shelter spaces, “the case would be diff erent and more 
diffi  cult.” See Adams (BCSC), supra note 89 at para 191. Th e Court of Appeal, however, 
appears not to have sensed the more complex and nuanced argument. Compare Adams 
(BCCA), supra note 89.
94. See e.g. Rusty Neal, Voices: Women, Poverty and Homelessness in Canada (Ottawa: 
National Anti-Poverty Organization, 2004), online: <http://intraspec.ca/
WomenPovertyAndHomelessnessInCanada.pdf>; Leslie Tutty, Cindy Ogden & Gillian 
Weaver-Dunlop, An Environmental Scan of Strategies to Safely House Abused Women 
(Calgary: RESOLVE Alberta, 31 October 2008), online: <http://www.ucalgary.ca/resolve/
reports/2008/2008-02.pdf>; Shawn Bayes & Alison Brewin, Bridging the Divide: Building 
Safe Shelters for Women and Families in BC (Vancouver: Elizabeth Fry Society, March 
2012), online: <http://www.elizabethfry.com/initiatives/documents/Bridging-the-Divide-
Building-Safe-Shelters-for-Women-Families.pdf>; Leslie Tutty, Cindy Ogden & Gillian 
Weaver-Dunlop, Feasibility Study for a National Network of Women’s Shelters and Transition 
Homes (Calgary: RESOLVE Alberta, 31 March 2007), online: <http://www.ucalgary.ca/
resolve/reports/2007/2007-01.pdf>.
95. Bayes & Brewin, ibid at 7.
96. Ibid. Many homeless women do not feel safe in temporary accommodation. Women have a 
higher risk of physical and sexual violence and those who reside in co-ed shelters report being 
in constant fear of violence from co-resident men. A recent study conducted found that of all 
British Columbia shelters, female-only facilities represented only 17 per cent of shelter spaces 
available. As a result, undesignated co-ed space is becoming all that is available in many areas. 
Increasingly, it is not just women-only shelters that are limited, but also designated women-
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availability will miss this point unless gender is taken into account as a relevant 
feature of claimant identity. Neither level of court in Adams did this, though the 
issue was raised by the Poverty and Human Rights Centre, who were intervenors 
at the Court of Appeal level. But the ramifi cations of gender—which shape both 
the desirability and the actual availability of shelter options for women—were 
left judicially unacknowledged.97 Admittedly, such further shaping of the group 
of claimants was unnecessary given the simple math of the availability even of 
co-ed shelters. Th is case thus shows how claimant identity, in its full complexity, is 
also relevant to the success and shaping of section 7 claims. Th e character, framing, 
and reach of the harms at issue under any section 7 claim necessarily rest on the 
conceptualization of the relevant identity features of the group or individual 
experiencing these harms.
Th is general failure to appreciate and to be explicit about the complexity and 
fl uidity of the connections between individual identity and oppression, and how 
individual and group experience is so cast, condemns courts, in their assessment 
of redistributive rights claims, to miss the substantial oppressions that form core 
injustices in our society. Judicial analyses under both section 7 and section 15 
betray too confi dent and precise a pinpointing of individual and group identity 
in light of broader existence, meshing, and patterns of social divisions.
III. CHOICE: AGENCY AND ACTION
Th is conceptual failure, or lack of attention to complexity, bears unfortunate 
fruit in at least one other doctrinal regard. Understanding the social world and 
individual identity as multiple and complex has clear implications for how the 
idea of choice ought not to fi gure in constitutional argument. By “choice,” I mean 
to capture the idea of individual volition, intention, or agency that underpins 
assignment of normative responsibility for outcomes to the individual. Th e idea 
of choice denotes the popular image of the “autonomous, liberal (legal) subject,” 
morally responsible for the outcomes of his or her actions.98 Th is is “the sovereign 
self ” residing at the heart of liberalism and fuelling so much of liberalism’s 
preoccupation with legitimate state power and with rights as a bulwark against 
only space within co-ed shelters. Ibid at 3, 7.
97. Hamill, supra note 92 at 96.
98. Rosemary Hunter & Sharon Cowan, “Introduction” in Rosemary Hunter & Sharon Cowan, 
eds, Choice and Consent: Feminist Engagements with Law and Subjectivity (Abingdon, UK: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 1 at 1.
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such power.99 I have elsewhere cautioned “against understanding ‘choice’—or its 
absence—as an essential confi guring factor in rights claims under the Charter.”100 
I want to elaborate on this concern and tie it to both a judicial failure to appreciate 
this underlying complexity as well as the diffi  culty that claimants have in anchoring 
social justice challenges in the Charter.101 Choice as spoiler fi gures in both section 
15 and section 7 cases; it even lurks threateningly in the background of recent 
apparent victories for social justice challenges. Th ree older section 15 cases and 
three more recent section 7 cases illustrate this well.102 
A. SECTION 15
Two of the section 15 cases I examine involved discrimination claims on the 
ground of marital status (not coincidentally an analogous section 15 ground that 
involves a central contractualized relationship in our society). Both cases involved 
unsuccessful attempts to argue for an equality-mandated expansion of benefi ts 
fl owing from opposite-sex, common law relationships. In the fi rst of these, the 
2002 case of Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh,103 the claimant, Susan Walsh, 
sought revision of the Nova Scotia Matrimonial Property Act104 to include unmarried 
opposite-sex cohabitants in the statutory defi nition of “spouse.” Absent revision, 
Walsh was denied the presumption of equal distribution of matrimonial property 
upon the dissolution of her common law relationship. Th e second section 15 
case, Hodge v Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development),105 focused on 
the Canada Pension Plan requirement that a common law spouse must have 
99. Ibid at 28.
100. Margot Young, “Context, Choice and Rights: PHS Community Services Society v Canada 
(Attorney General)” (2011) 44:1 UBC L Rev 221 at 248.
101. For an interesting reference to “choice” or individual autonomy in the context of judicial 
elaboration of analogous grounds under s 15(1), see Rosalind Dixon, “Th e Supreme 
Court of Canada and Constitutional (Equality) Baselines” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 
637. Although the focus of her discussion is on contrasting modes of judicial extension of 
analogous grounds under s 15, the linkage she draws in one portion of her argument between 
“choice” and immutability has interesting resonances with arguments in this article. (Ibid) 
at 653.
102. Just before this article went to print, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its 
judgment in Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5, 21 RFL (7th) 1. Interestingly, 
the dissenting judgments of Justice Abella and Chief Justice McLachlin would confi ne 
consideration of “choice” to s 1 justifi catory arguments. However, the majority judgment was 
not similarly attuned to the same concerns. Justice LeBel wrote the majority judgment and 
followed a line of reasoning consistent with that critiqued in this article.
103. 2002 SCC 83, 4 SCR 325 [Walsh].
104. RSNS 1989, c 275.
105. 2004 SCC 65, 3 SCR. 357 [Hodge].
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cohabited with the pension contributor for at least one year prior to survivor 
pension eligibility. Th ere was no such requirement for a married spouse. Betty 
Hodge argued that, relative to separated but still married couples, this constituted 
discrimination against her relationship type. 
Th e judgment in Walsh is most obviously stalked by the willful claimant, a 
claimant who opts for circumstances of which she then complains. Th e majority 
decision to reject the equality complaint, written by Justice Bastarache, concludes 
that the presence of consent and choice is crucial: “A decision not to marry should 
be respected because it also stems from a conscious choice of the parties.”106 Th e 
distinction drawn by the matrimonial property exclusion respects this decision 
not to marry. To fi nd otherwise, the majority asserts, would be to use the Charter’s 
guarantees of equality and respect for individual dignity to undermine the 
autonomous exercise of individual choice.107 Th is would be a failure to actually 
respect the complainant’s dignity. Justice Bastarache thus trumpets the primacy 
of choice: “choice must be paramount.”108 Liberty is an underlying value of the 
Charter and, as such, it informs the inquiry into discrimination.109 Th e claimant 
is “free to take steps” necessary to address through her own agency any concerns 
about private property distribution upon relationship breakdown.110 With choice 
so centrally assumed, the harm such choice could have avoided cannot be the 
basis for state obligations under section 15.
Reliance on choice, or agency, is less obvious but still powerful in Hodge. 
Much of the reasoning in this case revolves around identifying the appropriate 
comparator group for Betty Hodge. Th e majority casts the comparator group so 
as to remove from the frame any unequal treatment of the claimant and others in 
similar circumstances.111 Th is leaves the Court vulnerable to my earlier critique 
that its analytical lens is shaded selectively to leave some oppression invisible. 
However, in its last substantive paragraph of the judgment, the Court eff ectively 
unravels its own reasoning when it states:
106. Walsh, supra note 103 at para 55.
107. Ibid at para 43.
108. Ibid.
109. In the Walsh decision, Bastarache J said: “it is important to note that the discriminatory 
aspect of the legislative distinction must be determined in light of Charter values. One of 
those essential values is liberty … . Limitations imposed by this Court that serve to restrict 
this freedom of choice among persons in conjugal relationships would be contrary to our 
notions of liberty” (ibid at para 63).
110. Ibid at para 55.
111. Justice Binnie, for the Court, stated that the relevant comparison was to divorced spouses, for 
whom survivor benefi ts were equally not available. Hodge, supra note 105 at para 47.
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[T]he foregoing analysis deals with heterosexual couples, not homosexual couples. 
Until such time as the issue of same-sex marriage has been resolved, it is possible that 
diff erent considerations would apply to gay and lesbian relationships in respect of a 
survivor’s pension because, at least in the past, the institution of a legal marriage has 
not been available to them.112
Th is is the reader’s “Aha!” moment in this decision. Th e formal possibility for 
the claimant as a member of a heterosexual couple to choose marriage justifi es 
the fi nding that Hodge has no right against the state to address her consequent 
circumstances that fl ow from her rejection of this option. When one makes the 
“wrong” choice, one seemingly has no right.
We can see a similar assumption of claimant agency underpinning disentitle-
ment in the Gosselin case as well. In the trial judgment, Louise Gosselin herself is 
presented as largely to blame for her own unfortunate circumstances:
En eff et, il est constant que l’être humain qui a développé les qualités de force, 
courage, pérséverance et discipline surmonte et maîtrise généralement les obstacles 
éducatifs, psychiques et même physiques qui pourraient l’entraîner dans la pauvreté 
matérielle.113 
Th e majority judgment of the SCC, written by Chief Justice McLachlin, reiterates 
this assessment implicitly in its fi rst paragraph: 
Louise Gosselin was born in 1959. She has led a diffi  cult life, complicated by a 
struggle with psychological problems and drug and alcohol addictions. From time 
to time she has tried to work, attempting jobs such as cook, waitress, salesperson, 
and nurse’s assistant, among many. But work would wear her down or cause her 
stress, and she would quit.114  
Further on in her judgment, Chief Justice McLachlin returns to such explanatory 
statements, noting that Gosselin faced “personal problems, which included 
psychological and substance abuse components.”115 Th e case became one about 
“bad, individual choices … overridden by state-imposed choice, purportedly in 
the interest of (future) dignity.”116 Th ere was no discrimination. State action was a 
112. Ibid at para 48.
113. Gosselin c Québec (Procureur general), [1992] RJQ 1647 at 266, JQ no 928 (Qc Sup Ct) (QL) 
as cited in Jackman, “Castaways,” supra note 6 at 320. Translation as off ered by Jackman: 
“In eff ect it is always the case that a human being who has developed qualities of strength, 
courage, perseverance and discipline generally overcomes and masters the educational, 
psychological and even physical obstacles that could pull him into material poverty.”
114. Gosselin, supra note 77 at para 1.
115. Ibid at para 48.
116. Sheila McIntyre, “Th e Equality Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court: Back to the 70s” 
(2010) 50:2 Sup Ct L Rev 129 at 176 [McIntyre, “Equality”]. See also Dianne Pothier, “But 
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corrective for bad choice (individual agency), and the consequences of such state 
action followed from the original poor choices of the individual. Th e notion of 
choice and individual agency agilely defeat Gosselin’s claim.117 
B. SECTION 7
Similar invocation of choice shadows recent judicial analysis in both the Insite118 
and Adams cases. Th e Insite case involved challenges to federal criminalization of 
activities in a provincially run, supervised safe injection site. Adams, as already 
detailed, dealt with a challenge to a municipal by-law prohibiting temporary 
shelter in public parks. In both cases, section 7 rights were more easily claimed 
due to the trial judges’ factual fi ndings that choice was not meaningfully implicated 
in the claimants’ circumstances. Th e trial judge in Insite sees addiction as the 
result of a range of
personal, governmental and legal factors: a mixture of genetic, psychological, 
sociological and familial problems; the inability, despite serious and prolonged 
eff orts, of municipal, provincial and federal governments, as well as numerous 
non-profi t organizations, to provide meaningful and eff ective support and solutions; 
and the failure of the criminal law to prevent the traffi  cking of controlled substances 
in the DTES.119 
Individual volition is not a signifi cant feature in this list.
In Adams, the claimants’ homelessness was similarly attributed to a matrix 
of factors, of which individual will was equally an insignifi cant element. In each 
case, the relevant attorney general argued that the activities regulated—drug 
addiction or supervised injection in Insite and homelessness in Adams—were 
simply “lifestyle” choices.120 Judicial rejection of these arguments and acceptance of 
the absence of choice as a determining factor in each set of claimants’ circumstances 
It’s for Your Own Good” in Margot Young et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship and 
Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 40.
117. For a similar argument in relation to Symes v Canada, [1993] 4 SCR 695, 110 DLR (4th) 
470, see Rebecca Johnson, Taxing Choices: Th e Intersection of Class, Gender, Parenthood, and 
the Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002). Johnson argues that Beth Symes, the s 15 claimant 
in this case, fi gures as the selfi sh, wilful working mother who complains of the results of her 
own choices. From this perspective, her claim is defeated. Froc regards this case also as an 
illustration of the Court’s trouble in recognizing that privilege and subordination can co-
occur. See Froc, supra note 32 at 28.
118. PHS Community Services Society v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 BCSC 661, 293 DLR 
(4th) 392 [Insite (BCSC)], aff ’d 2010 BCCA 15, 314 DLR (4th) 209 [Insite (BCCA)].
119. Insite (BCSC), ibid at para 89.
120. Th is argument was made by the Attorney General of Canada in Insite (SCC), supra note 18 
(Factum of the Appellant at para 97).
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enabled a relatively uncomplicated tale of government interference with protected 
liberty, life, and security of the person. Th us, very crucially, successful assertion of 
section 7 rights in these cases relied on judicial rejection of government arguments 
that individual blameworthiness or wilful choice should be considered a signifi cant 
factor in generating the harm about which the claimants complained. 
Th e courts left open the possibility that the presence of choice—in another 
scenario—might result in just the kind of disentitlement the government pled in 
each case. Th at is, choice might have mattered as it did in the section 15 cases 
just discussed. Th is retention of choice as an assessment factor in both section 15 
and section 7 cases ignores the lessons of intersectionality theory. It parlays the 
courts’ own language about contextual analysis into the very kind of denial of 
inevitable and deep context cautioned against by theorists. If choice so matters, 
then the courts ignore the clear message of much social theory that individual 
actions and choices are constrained, shaped, and made possible by larger systemic 
norms, structures, and institutions. At the very least, individual circumstances 
refl ect a complicated “intermingling among issues of agency, exposure, and 
vulnerability … .”121 Individual choice is always compromised by historic 
and current material and symbolic systems. Simple causal invocation of choice 
reduces the social matrix that theorists attempt to capture to a false simplicity.122 
Acceding to the picture of the social world painted by the observations detailed 
in Part I demands that individual autonomy or agency be understood in a particular 
way. Individual choice must be seen as constructed and limited by material and 
symbolic conditions, both systemic and individual. Indeed, the very oppression 
of which claimants complain will also constrain their choices.123 Th us, the greater 
the inequality or injustice that claimants face, the less meaningful ascription of 
choice may be. Social and economic structures “channel … outcomes”124 for 
individuals: “preferences might themselves be a result of deep-seated constraints 
within the social structure.”125 Th rough such processes, inequality is systemically 
enforced: “perspectives of the powerful defi ne and shape individual and cultural 
121. Robert RM Verchick, “Katrina, Feminism, and Environmental Justice” (2008) 13:4 Cardozo 
JL & Gender 791 at 800.
122. For an explanation of the development of the matrix metaphor, see Froc, supra note 32.
123. See generally, Razack, supra note 20; Carole Pateman, Th e Sexual Contract (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 1988).
124. Sheila McIntyre, “Backlash Against Equality: Th e ‘Tyranny’ of the ‘Politically Correct,’” 
(1993) 38:1 McGill LJ 1 at 29 [McIntyre, “Backlash”].
125. Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 14. 
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defi nitions of value … rationaliz[ing] existing unequal distributions of power.”126 
Even “meaningful” choice often refl ects oppressive background conditions and 
cannot be distilled from that oppression. Th at an individual can be understood 
to have “chosen” something is not necessarily adequate to justify the outcomes 
that follow from such a choice. Th is is, at least partly, because choice is seldom 
unconstrained or unframed by context and circumstances.127  
Others have also made this observation. Sandra Fredman refers to the “social 
meaning of choice”128 and Diana Majury to the necessity of a “more sceptical, 
problematized approach to choice.”129 Sheila McIntyre has echoed concern about 
the “ascription to the claimant of unencumbered free choice.”130 Courts have also, 
on occasion, seen that choice can be illusory. In Miron v Trudel,131 both Justice 
McLachlin (as she then was) and Justice L’Heureux-Dubé found a section 15 
infringement in part on the basis of an absence of meaningful choice. Similar 
recognition has occurred in relation to other rights in the Charter. For example, 
referring to the section 2(a) right in the case of Zylberberg v Sudbury Board 
of Education (Director),132 the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the option 
of choice in these circumstances for these complainants was formal only. Th e 
real option was simply “compulsion to conform to the religious practices of the 
majority” as “children are disinclined at this age to step out of line or to fl out 
‘peer-group norms.’”133 
However, I want to go further and reject completely the utility of reference 
to choice as a mechanism for rejecting a rights claim. Justifi cation for this is both 
theoretical and political, as I have argued before.134 Th e confi gured and contingent 
character of choice—as social theorists elaborate—means that the criterion of 
choice is inadequate to foreclose a rights analysis. Judges are ill-suited to disentangle 
126. McIntyre, “Backlash,” supra note 124 at 29 [citations omitted].
127. It is also because even “meaningful” choice may result in subordinating and oppressive 
outcomes that a substantive equality analysis might condemn the harm, whether or not these 
outcomes were “chosen.” See Part III(C), below.
128. Supra note 125 at 14
129.  “Women Are Th emselves to Blame: Choice as a Justifi cation for Unequal Treatment” in Fay 
Faraday, Margaret Denike & M Kate Stephenson, eds, Making Equality Rights Real: Securing 
Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 209 at 215.
130. McIntyre, “Equality,” supra note 116 at 176.
131. [1995] 2 SCR 418 at paras 95-97, 153, 23 OR (3d) 160.
132. (1988) 65 OR (2d) 641, 52 DLR (4th) 577 [Zylberberg cited to OR]. Th anks to Benjamin 
L Berger for pointing out these commonalities in the area of freedom of religion. For a 
perceptive discussion of choice and freedom of religion, see Berger, supra note 36.
133. Zylberberg, ibid at para 38.
134. Young, “Unequal,” supra note 16.
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the social and individual factors that shape, limit, or expand choice. Th is is most 
apparent in relation to those individuals most marginalized or disadvantaged in 
Canadian society—individuals whose social, economic, and cultural experiences 
least match the biographical facts of the average Canadian judge.135 Th e vulnerabili-
ties and constraints of marginality and extreme disadvantage may be alien to the 
judges who sit in determination of these rights claims and therefore too dif-
fi cult for them to discern and appreciate. Looking to choice risks inaccurate 
attribution of agency as the fulcrum on which a case should turn. It is objec-
tionable to persist in using an element in rejecting rights claims that promises 
to be so often misread and thus misused, particularly in relation to those most in 
need of their rights. Th us, theory about “the true variety of human experiences”136 
should lead us to reject judicial refl ection on the presence or absence of choice as 
justifi cation for relieving the state of obligation under a Charter right. 
Th e other—political—point is that foregrounding choice (either its absence 
or its presence) as a means of establishing state responsibility asserts a model 
of individual accountability and a corresponding lack of state responsibility 
that ill fi ts progressive rights protections. Indeed, it sits uncomfortably with 
claims for a progressive society marked by collective concern for inclusion, 
human fl ourishing, and social justice. It should not be the case that harms 
are addressable as rights claims only when individual choice does not cause the 
outcome at issue in some manner. More powerfully, why should we obsess with 
“fault” where human fl ourishing is imperilled? We have abandoned defendant 
intent as relevant to the determination that discrimination has occurred or that 
some discriminatory harm has been experienced by the claimant. Similarly, 
rejecting claimant choice as relevant to defendant obligation is equally fi tting. 
Rights under the Charter must do more than simply abandon the unfortunate—
however implicated they are in their own misfortune—to their miserable fates. 
Th us, choice—even a reasonable fi nding of the availability of meaningful 
choice—should never alone excuse the state from obligations under section 7 
and section 15. Even if it were reasonably possible to ascertain when choice was 
and was not meaningfully available to avoid or shape the situation of which the 
rights claimant complains, such choice or agency should nonetheless not matter. 
Th e focus instead should be on the harm that is apparent. Focus on choice or 
agency risks, in the words of political theorist Elizabeth Anderson, neglecting 
“the distinctively political aims of egalitarianism” relevant to both equality rights 
135. Ibid at 197.
136. Levit, supra note 35 at 227.
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and liberty rights.137 Anderson’s notion of “democratic equality,” something she 
argues is characteristic of a just society, grants to all citizens “eff ective access to the 
social conditions of their freedom at all times”138 and “neither presume[s] to tell 
people how to use their opportunities nor attempt[s] to judge how responsible 
people are for choices that lead to unfortunate outcomes.”139 Inequality and 
constraints upon fundamental freedoms relevant to sections 7 and 15 obligate 
the state to respond on the basis of substantive theories of equality and citizenship 
alone, not because of the additional absence of individual complainant culpability 
or blame. A society where oppression and exclusion are tolerated or excused is 
not a society marked by equality and liberty. If such an unjust society is not 
what we want our society to be, then it cannot be what we allow our Charter 
to overlook.140 
Attaching inquiry into the presence or absence of meaningful individual 
choice to standard section 7 or section 15 doctrinal analysis is a variant of the 
“state action” question, transposed into an additional Charter locale. Or, at least, 
it is the negative counterpoint to such a concern. Only if the individual has not 
somehow “caused” the harm will the state be potentially obligated. Th is is the risk 
that focus on claimant choice engages. Th us, even if some form of state action 
has already been shown under the section 32 argument (or not discussed but 
assumed), identifi cation of another actor or other source of agency will potentially 
remove the constitutional burden from the state. Th e state, in eff ect, gets two 
chances to absolve itself of responsibility.141 
Th e force of such an imposition lies with the idea of the neo-liberal citizen as 
rational chooser of all of his or her life circumstances. Th e world such an individual 
inhabits is not only uncompromised by diff erences in bargaining power but also 
one in which individuals are unmarked by context. “Diff erence” is irrelevant and the 
individual remains “free to take steps to deal with [the situation]” about which 
she or he complains.142 As Sheila McIntyre notes, invocation of choice as tonic to a 
137. Elizabeth S Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” (1999) 109 Ethics 287 at 288.
138. Ibid at 289.
139. Ibid.
140. Although not a part of the immediate argument, erasing the distinction between negative 
and positive state obligations follows.
141. See also Sagen v Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter 
Games, 2009 BCSC 942, 98 BCLR (4th) 109, aff ’d 2009 BCCA 522, 98 BCLR (4th) 141. 
Th e BCSC decision illustrates a similar reoccurrence in the s 15 context, this time in relation 
to the agency of the third party, the International Olympic Committee. Th e same illogic or 
unfairness in the substantive rights analysis permits a successful s 32 claim to founder on the 
absence of state action. On appeal, the s 32 stage instead was the basis for dismissing the claim.
142. Walsh, supra note 103 at para 55.
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discrimination claim “individuates a collective and systemic problem.”143 It turns 
systemic unfairness into individual bad choice, and the historic and layered harms 
of the marginal and dispossessed are foisted off  as personal failure and foible. 
C. CHOICE AND LIBERTY
Th e assertion of the unsuitability of choice to short circuit rights claims leaves me 
in a tricky spot. So, I end this consideration of choice as an unfortunate presence in 
social justice constitutional challenges by noting that the argument must fi nesse 
a rather sticky point about liberty. Th e value of liberty is central to the rights that 
our Charter protects. As already noted, the Court understands equality rights to 
be informed by individual dignity, a key component of which is respect for the 
individual’s autonomy. Th e equality analysis in Law, since overtaken by Kapp,144 
foregrounds dignity in a way that makes clear the connection between choice 
and the core purpose of equality: “the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) is concerned 
with the realization of personal autonomy and self-determination.”145 And, of 
course, liberty is explicitly protected by section 7. Th e Supreme Court of Canada 
has been unwavering in its insistence that the liberty interest enshrined in section 
7 protects intimate choice and important personal agency. I do not mean to 
disrupt this observation. But in light of this, can it make sense to cast off  so fully 
the relevance of the presence of individual agency for judicial rejection of rights 
challenges? Can agency, or choice, matter for the purpose of establishing a formal 
entitlement, but not at all as an explanation for individual claimant circumstances 
that relieves others of responsibility? Moreover, for marginalized and oppressed 
groups, the language of choice and empowerment is not of small import.146 Surely, 
the groups championed by social justice claims have fought hard for these markers 
of liberal personhood. What then of my rejection of choice as relevant to relieving 
the state of rights obligations?
Some insights from a recent work by Jennifer Nedelsky are useful here. 
Nedelsky notes that the capacity for action, for agency, for freedom, and for 
human will are insistently “cherished and protected” in Western culture.147 But 
Nedelsky charts a diff erent course for understanding the relationship between the 
143. McIntyre, “Equality,” supra note 116 at 177
144. R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, 2 SCR 483.
145. Law, supra note 61 at para 53.
146. See Angela McRobbie, “After Post-Feminism: Neo-Liberalism and New Family Values” 
(Paper delivered at the DARG and CAMARG anniversary conference, Loughborough 
University, UK, March 2012), [on fi le with author].
147. Supra note 47 at 115.
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individual and the collective than employment of the metaphor of “boundary.” 
She contests this imagery, arguing that it “distorts our understanding by splitting 
it off  from, and setting it up in opposition to, the integration, interpenetration, 
and unity that are also part of our humanness and without which the capacity 
for creative action would not exist.”148 In essence, we are both autonomous and 
dependent—characteristics that are, paradoxically, mutually enabling. It is this 
chord of tension between autonomy and dependence that I wish to emphasize 
and that my partial critique of the relevance of choice plucks. My distress at 
the prospect of constitutionally legitimated abandonment by the collective of 
the unfortunate among us leads me to conclude that it is coherent to respect 
choice or agency as protected by rights, but not to allow attribution of choice 
or agency to derail claims for fundamental justice and equality from the state 
when rights-relevant harms are shown. Tolerating tension between independence 
and vulnerability as equal parts of the human condition allows for, and indeed 
demands, this.
IV. CONCLUSION
Transposition of complex theoretical discussions about oppression and subordi-
nation into the legal arena of Charter rights litigation is challenging. Th ere is no 
simple formula for enabling judges to see what must be seen and to acknowledge 
what must be acknowledged in the varied contexts of the cases that represent, 
discretely, larger systemic injustices and failures. Th eorists have generated a raft of 
metaphors in the attempt to convey eff ectively how power sorts individuals and 
groups. No one metaphor can do this completely, but these metaphors are aids 
in ensuring that a critical capacity to re-imagine, and then re-imagine again, is 
possible. Th is does not mean that metaphors do not become stale and limiting, 
but it does mean that they are important tools in a complex task. Th e point is to 
recognize the limitation of our methods and modes of capturing what is inarguably 
a dense and sticky matrix of social divisions and logics. Judges, no less than social, 
legal, and political theorists, must struggle with how to appreciate this even as 
their task demands more simple and expeditious analysis. 
In a sense, then, court judgments are like maps.149 Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos writes that maps, in order to meet their purpose, must “inevitably distort 
148. Ibid.
149. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, among others, proposes a variant of this metaphor. He refers to 
“law” rather than “judgments” in Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in 
the Paradigmatic Transition (New York: Routledge, 1998) at 458.
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reality.”150 Th is does not mean, however, that maps must be inaccurate or not 
useful. But it does mean that maps have variable possibilities as to the scale or 
detail represented, a particular compromise as to what is projected largely and 
what is not, a fi xed place of view that is privileged, and systems of shorthand 
or “signs” that are (or are not) conventionally determined.151 Cases, as artefacts of 
law, share these features. Th e judge, like the cartographer, has the task of making 
decisions about how to orchestrate implementation of these features. I am arguing 
for better, more attentive, self-conscious, and acknowledged mapping by judges 
in social justice cases. Otherwise, judicial erasure of larger systemic conditions 
and structures as important features of individual and collective circumstances 
simply ensures that points of access for eff ective use of Charter rights are made 
invisible or politically unavailable. Th is is particularly the case for those claims 
that issue from the most socially marginalized and politically oppressed. And, social 
justice will continue to elude our society, or, at least, it will not be substantively 
advanced by Charter litigation. 
150. Ibid at 459.
151. Ibid at 459.
